Knowledge, Belief, and Science Education by Silva Filho, Waldomiro et al.
1 23
Science & Education
Contributions from History, Philosophy
and Sociology of Science and
Mathematics
 
ISSN 0926-7220
 
Sci & Educ
DOI 10.1007/s11191-016-9834-6
Knowledge, Belief, and Science Education
Tiago Alfredo S. Ferreira, Charbel N. El-
Hani & Waldomiro José da Silva-Filho
1 23
Your article is protected by copyright and all
rights are held exclusively by Springer Science
+Business Media Dordrecht. This e-offprint
is for personal use only and shall not be self-
archived in electronic repositories. If you wish
to self-archive your article, please use the
accepted manuscript version for posting on
your own website. You may further deposit
the accepted manuscript version in any
repository, provided it is only made publicly
available 12 months after official publication
or later and provided acknowledgement is
given to the original source of publication
and a link is inserted to the published article
on Springer's website. The link must be
accompanied by the following text: "The final
publication is available at link.springer.com”.
ARTICLE
Knowledge, Belief, and Science Education
A Contribution from the Epistemology of Testimony
Tiago Alfredo S. Ferreira1 • Charbel N. El-Hani2 •
Waldomiro Jose´ da Silva-Filho3,4
! Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2016
Abstract This article intends to show that the defense of ‘‘understanding’’ as one of the
major goals of science education can be grounded on an anti-reductionist perspective on
testimony as a source of knowledge. To do so, we critically revisit the discussion between
Harvey Siegel and Alvin Goldman about the goals of science education, especially where it
involves arguments based on the epistemology of testimony. Subsequently, we come back
to a discussion between Charbel N. El-Hani and Eduardo Mortimer, on the one hand, and
Michael Hoffmann, on the other, striving to strengthen the claim that rather than students’
belief change, understanding should have epistemic priority as a goal of science education.
Based on these two lines of discussion, we conclude that the reliance on testimony as a
source of knowledge is necessary to the development of a more large and comprehensive
scientific understanding by science students.
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1 Introduction
The debate about the goals of science teaching involves at the least a combination of moral
and epistemic elements. More than that, it is possible to claim that:
Fruitful and responsible discussions of educational policy inevitably move to the larger philosophic
questions that prompt and inform them: those issues are most acutely articulated and examined in
moral and political theory, epistemology, and the philosophy of mind (Rorty 1998, p. 1).
Philosophy of education has been reinvigorated by a series of thoughtful works only
recently, despite the close relation between philosophical and educational reflections and
the recurring presence of issues related to education in philosophical texts along the history
of philosophy (Siegel 2005). It is even less common to find in the literature the treatment of
specific issues, such as the one concerning the relation between knowledge and belief in
science education, which is consequential to cultural issues in science education and, in
particular, to multicultural education. This is an important gap, since this relevant
discussion cannot advance without closely relating educational and epistemological
knowledge. Recently, the literature on science education has dealt with this topic (e.g.,
Smith and Siegel 2004), but, despite the important contributions already available, we
consider that two aspects will play a key role in moving forward this debate: First, instead
of providing general epistemological perspectives on the problem only, it is crucial to
deepen our understanding by examining the problem under the light of different
epistemological theories; second, contemporary approaches to epistemology deserve
attention, in their relation to science education and its goals.
While some authors claim that the primary goal of science education should be a change in
students’ beliefs (e.g., Alters 1997), others argue that science education should aim primarily at
students’ understanding of scientific theories, models, concepts (e.g., Cobern 1996).1 In this
article,weaimat showing that themoral and epistemicdecisionof focusingonunderstanding as
a key goal in science teaching can begroundedon an anti-reductionist proposal about testimony
as a source of knowledge. For this purpose, we will discuss some elements of Harvey Siegel’s
(2005) critiqueofAlvinGoldman’s (1999) viewof the goals of science teaching, situatedwithin
an epistemology of testimony, and will subsequently analyze Michael Hoffmann’s (2007)
arguments in his criticism to Charbel El-Hani and Eduardo Mortimer (2007).
2 Goldman on the Goals of Science Education
Goldman makes use of anti-reductionist arguments concerning the epistemic role of tes-
timony to criticize the adoption of ‘‘critical thinking’’ as an essential goal of science
education. In turn, Siegel criticizes Goldman’s anti-reductionism. This criticism is part of
an argument that considers understanding (which includes critical thinking, but does not
reduce to it) as an essential goal of science education. Here, we intend to argue that
understanding and knowledge can be considered as primary goals of science teaching
without abandoning Goldman’s arguments about the epistemology of testimony.2
1 Considering the polysemous nature of the term ‘‘understanding,’’ we will limit its usage here to the
perspective offered by Smith and Siegel (2004). As explained in more detail in Sect. 5, these authors
propose four criteria that should be satisfied if we are to say that one understands a concept or idea:
connectedness, sense-making, application, and justification.
2 There is a recent debate in epistemology on the distinction between ‘‘knowledge’’ and ‘‘understanding’’
around the idea of ‘‘epistemic value’’ (e.g., Elgin 2006), but we will not discuss this topic here.
T. A. S. Ferreira et al.
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Goldman (1999) addresses the goals of science education in an influential work aiming
at systematizing the proposal of a social epistemology. Social epistemology can be con-
ceived as covering:
all systematic reflection on the social dimension or nature of cognitive achievements such as
knowledge, true belief, justified belief, understanding, or wisdom (Kusch 2011, p. 873).
More specifically, Goldman (1999) asks how individuals can acquire knowledge from their
interactions with others. He assumes a weak, deflated meaning for knowledge, which is
presented by him as ‘‘merely’’ a true belief. Although it is not entirely out of the
correspondence tradition, this view involves elements of a deflationist approach that avoids
the criticisms against the proposal of a point-to-point correspondence with objective
reality. Goldman’s focus lies rather on social practices that typically lead to truth. These
practices are usually involved in argumentation, communication, and testimony (Kusch
2011).
For Goldman (1999), the acquisition of knowledge as true belief is the goal of edu-
cation. Siegel argues, however, against the epistemic priority of this goal, proposing
critical thinking (Siegel 2005) or, more broadly speaking, understanding (Smith and Siegel
2004) as part of the fundamental goals of education. Goldman worries that Siegel’s pro-
posal does not take in due account that much of daily education consists of teachers
teaching through statements that are not necessarily backed by reasons and arguments
offered in support of them. He claims that teachers expect that their students accept at least
part of their statements without other evidence than the teacher’s own testimony. More
than a question merely related to the teachers’ wishes, what is at stake is that no one can
defend every premise of every argument with further premises without falling into an
infinite regress (Goldman 1999, p. 364).
Goldman uses arguments inspired by the epistemology of testimony to justify what he
regards as a major value, namely truth as the goal of science education. His criticism to the
proposal that critical thinking should be given the same epistemic weight than knowledge
as true belief is presented as follows:
I am very sympathetic to some form of critical-thinking approach, but this is not incompatible with
veritism. Unlike many critical-thinking advocates (such as Siegel), I do not see critical thinking as an
epistemic end in itself. Critical thinking or rational inference is a useful means to the fundamental
epistemic end of true belief (Goldman 1999, p. 363).
Thus, critical thinking plays, for Goldman, just an instrumental role in the process through
which the student may reach the major goal of science education, namely knowledge as
true belief.
In his reply to Goldman, Siegel (2005) uses two argumentative strategies, in which he
questions the relations between ‘‘truth and thinking’’ and ‘‘testimony and trust’’ in order to
advocate that truth does not have a greater epistemic weight than critical thinking when
establishing the goals of science education. In the first strategy, Siegel claims that true
belief is not sufficient to the goals of science education. To justify this claim, he argues that
if true belief was sufficient, many questionable ways of reaching it would be allowed (e.g.,
indoctrination and brainwashing). To avoid such questionable means, science teachers
should assume as a goal that students not only possess true beliefs, but also critically
appraise the reasons that make them true. Then, the argument goes that truth cannot be
enough in science education because it is dependent on critical thinking in order to be an
acceptable goal. In the second strategy, Siegel builds a criticism of Goldman’s anti-re-
ductionism concerning testimony. This strategy will be the focus of our arguments here.
Knowledge, Belief, and Science Education: A Contribution…
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In another work, Mike Smith and Siegel (2004) argue that knowledge and understanding
are the primary goals of science education. Their concept of understanding includes critical
thinking but does not reduce to the latter. They characterize understanding in terms of four
conditions: connectedness, sense-making, application, and justification. Critical thinking is
related to justification. By justification, Smith and Siegel (2004, p. 562) mean a coherent
appraisal of at least some of the reasons that justify a claim, or, to put it differently, render
the claim worthy of belief. Critical thinking, in turn, is described by Siegel (1988,
pp. 43–44) as the ability to recognize the importance of reasons and properly assess them.
Both in Smith and Siegel (2004) and Siegel (1988), justification and critical thinking are
related to a perspective on education in which the student should be capable of recognizing
and evaluating at least part of the reasons that give support to a statement.
Siegel characterizes the goal of science education as follows:
On the view of ‘the crucial epistemic aim’ that I favor, education should strive to foster, not (just)
true belief, but (also) the skills, abilities and dispositions constitutive of critical thinking, and the
rational belief generated and sustained by it (Siegel 2005, p. 347).
Below we maintain that understanding and knowledge can be regarded as primary goals
of science teaching, instead of belief change, as one of the authors of the present article
previously argued (El-Hani and Mortimer 2007). We will consider, however, the need of
revising this argument to some extent, under the light of Hoffmann’s (2007) criticism. In
particular, it is necessary to clarify the meanings of ‘‘belief’’ and ‘‘belief change.’’ In the
next section, we argue that the proposal of understanding and knowledge as primary goals
of science education, shared by Siegel, Smith, Cobern, El-Hani, Mortimer, among other
authors, does not require an agreement with Siegel’s reductionist view of the role of
testimony as a source of knowledge. That is, we can assume understanding and knowledge
as goals of science education in the context of an anti-reductionist view of the epistemic
value of testimony.
3 Testimony and Knowledge: Reductionist and Anti-reductionist Views
of the Epistemic Value of Testimony
The problem of the role of testimony was already present in a discussion found in David
Hume’s works, particularly in the chapter ‘‘Of miracles’’ in his seminal work An Enquire
concerning Human Understanding (Hume 1748/2007), and, mainly, in Thomas Reid’s
works An Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense (1764/1983)
and Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man (1788/1983). However, it was only in the
1960s that the discussion on this topic gained more currency in the philosophical agenda,
following the works Belief, written by Henry Price (1969), and Self-knowledge and Self-
identity, by Sydney Shoemaker (1963). The most important hallmark in the revival of the
problem of testimony was C. A. J. Coady’s work Testimony: A Philosophical Study (1994).
Currently, there is a growing amount of works devoted to this topic.
Jennifer Lackey introduces the theme as follows:
Testimony is responsible, either directly or indirectly, for much of what we know, not only about the
world around us but also about who we are. Despite its relative historical neglect, recent work in
epistemology has seen a growing recognition of the importance and scope of testimonial knowledge.
Most of this work has focused on two central questions (…). First, is testimonial knowledge nec-
essarily acquired through transmission from speaker to hearer, or can testimony generate epistemic
features in its own right? Second, is justified dependence on testimony fundamentally basic, or is it
T. A. S. Ferreira et al.
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ultimately reducible to other epistemic sources, such as perception, memory, and reason? (Lackey
2011, p. 316).
Recently, the discussion on the role of testimony in the formation of our beliefs and in
the justification processes that can legitimate the epistemic status of knowledge has gained
renewed vigor. Refined arguments have been developed and defended by both authors who
regard testimony as a primary source of knowledge (the anti-reductionist position) and
authors who accept the possibility of testimony reliability provided that there testimony-
independent reasons that attribute credibility to the speaker in a given occasion (the
reductionist stance). That is, someone who assumes a reductionist position does not con-
sider testimony as a primary source of knowledge. Before proceeding, however, it is
important to bear in mind that the terms ‘‘reductionism’’ and ‘‘anti-reductionism’’ as used
in the context of the debates on the epistemology of testimony have no direct bearing on its
use in other contexts, as in the philosophy of mind (Lackey and Sosa 2006).
The anti-reductionist perspective, which can be traced back to Thomas Reid, can be
formulated as follows:
(…) testimony is a basic source of justification, on an epistemic par with sense perception, memory,
inference, and the like (Lackey 2011, p. 319).
In this sense, provided that there are no undefeated defeaters, hearers can be justified in
accepting what is said based merely on the speakers’ testimony. With the expression
‘‘undefeated defeaters,’’ we indicate that, if a teacher has in his or her school a reputation
of both being theoretically incompetent and showing a tendency to pretend to know many
subjects, one should not expect the students to be justified in accepting what is said by this
teacher without a deeper inquiry into other evidence for the contents of his or her
testimony.
In turn, the reductionist stance, whose historical origins usually go back to David Hume,
maintains that even in the absence of undefeated defeaters, the hearer needs other reasons
to be justified in accepting the testimony of a speaker. These reasons are typically the
outcome of induction:
(…) for instance, hearers observe a general conformity between reports and the corresponding facts
and, with the assistance of memory and reason, they inductively infer that certain speakers, contexts,
or types of reports are reliable sources of information (Lackey 2011, p. 319).
Regarding education, Goldman (1999) uses anti-reductionist arguments to ground his
defense that knowledge, in the truth-linked sense of ‘‘knowledge’’ (Goldman 1999, p. 357),
is the ultimate goal of science teaching. He argues, thus, that students do not necessarily
need to have reasons that are independent of the teachers’ testimony to secure knowledge
about a given topic. In a nutshell, this is his argument:
How does this apply to education? As noted, teachers commonly expect students to accept at least
some statements that they do not support with evidence. Indeed, teachers (like other people) cannot
give reasons for absolutely everything they assert, since reason giving must somewhere come to an
end. One cannot defend every premise of every argument with further premises, on pain of infinite
regress. To be sure, students might have reasons for trusting a teacher even if the teacher does not
state those reasons (Goldman 1999, p. 364).3
3 One might argue that this is not an anti-reductionist argument, as reductionists are not committed to
claiming that S’s belief that p is justified via T’s testimony only if S has independent reasons for believing
that p (is true?). Reductionists claim—the argument continues—that in order for S’s testimonial belief that
p to be justified, she must either have reason to trust the sort of testimony that T is giving in general or reason
to trust T’s testimony in this particular case. However, this is already a weakened version of reductionism,
appealing to the notion of a ‘‘sort’’ of testimony to counteract the criticisms of the reductionist position. But
Knowledge, Belief, and Science Education: A Contribution…
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Goldman is not merely stating that we can never justify our beliefs only through their
coherence with other justified beliefs. Besides the fact that students need to rely on the
acceptance of testimony to form their beliefs, he is arguing that we routinely rely on
testimony to acquire knowledge.
In the context of a debate on the goals of science teaching, Siegel (2005) attacks
Goldman’s anti-reductionist argument on the role of testimony as a source of knowledge.
When proposing that critical thinking does not have only an instrumental role in reaching
truth, but should be part of the goals of science teaching, Siegel develops his arguments
from a reductionist position concerning testimony, which is in agreement with what
Goldman calls the ‘‘good reasons approach’’ (GR). This good reasons approach, which
Goldman criticizes, could be based on the following principle:
(GR) A hearer is never justified in believing what a speaker (baldly) asserts unless the hearer has
good, independent reasons to trust the speaker on that occasion (Goldman 1999, p. 364).
According to the GR, the justification of one’s beliefs should necessarily go beyond trust in
testimony in its own right, taking non-testimonial reasons as a ground. The expression
‘‘independent reasons’’ refers to the reduction in testimony to other reasons, such as
perception and deduction.
Siegel argues that a critique of GR should maintain that students typically do not have
other reasons to believe in their teacher besides the content of the teacher’s testimony
itself. He stresses, however, that the students typically do have those other reasons4:
Students generally have a variety of independent (of testimony) reasons for trusting their teachers:
Teachers are in positions of authority; they possess relevant academic credentials; they are treated as
experts by their colleagues, administrators, and other adults (including the students’ parents); etc. All
this is readily observable by students, and provides them with at least some non-testimony-based
reasons for trusting their teachers (Siegel 2005, p. 361).
Siegel’s argument would be undefeatable if one was claiming that the students’ belief in
what the teacher says is exclusively due to the content of the testimony of that teacher,
specifically. However, we should bear in mind that, even though the justification of a large
number of scientific and other beliefs takes place through testimony, we cannot reduce the
source of reliability to the statements of a single individual. On the contrary, we should
appeal to a web of testimonies (Coady 1994). If we state, then, that the teachers’ academic
credentials, expert status, etc., are themselves reliable because of an intricate web of
testimonies, Siegel’s argument looks weaker. In other words, the elements regarded as non-
testimonial by Siegel are ultimately testimonial if we accept the notion of a web of
testimonies.
Footnote 3 continued
this does not represent the reductionist view in a more general sense. Here, we use the following more
general notion of reductionism: ‘‘In contrast to non-reductionism, reductionists […] maintain that, in
addition to the absence of undefeated defeaters, hearers must also possess non-testimonially based positive
reasons in order to be justified in accepting the testimony of speakers (Lackey 2011, p. 319).’’ The version of
reductionism used by Goldman (1999) is compatible with this more general version of reductionism. As our
focus lies here on the debate between Goldman and Siegel, we will systematically use the term ‘‘reduc-
tionism’’ and derivatives to make reference to this version. Finally, it is important to notice that reductionist
arguments about testimony are different from other types of reductionism commonly discussed in philos-
ophy, for instance reductionism as a set of ontological, epistemological, and methodological claims about
the relations between different scientific domains (Brigandt and Love 2015).
4 Even though the use of the term ‘‘never’’ in the GR enunciation is too strong for Siegel, he clearly assumes
in his paper the thesis that the students typically have reasons that are independent from the testimony.
T. A. S. Ferreira et al.
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The notion of a ‘‘web of testimony’’ is crucial for the understanding of authority
positions, academic credentials, and so forth, and what the peers say also become reliable
due to the relations between testimonies within a specific community:
Various people tell him that they are members of the expert bodies and that the bodies really are
expert, others tell him that their sons and daughters are being trained by such bodies in some
expertise or other, and so on in a complicated web of testimony (Coady 1994, p. 283).
Coady’s argument makes sense under the light of externalism and, more specifically, of its
expression in the form of a reliabilist theory of justification. Externalism, both in its
reliabilist version (Goldman 2012) and in its semantic version (Brown 2004), advocates
that the contents of an individual’s intentional mental states, such as thoughts and beliefs,
logically and conceptually depend on the physical and social circumstances that are
external to her: If I think or believe that there is water in the glass, this thought of mine
depends, on the one hand, on the fact that there is water in the glass, and, on the other, on
the fact that I am a member of a linguistic community that uses the words ‘‘water’’,
‘‘glass’’, etc., to refer to certain experiential conditions in certain circumstances. In these
terms, what determines, at least in part, the contents of our thoughts and beliefs are the
relations we maintain with the external world, both social and linguistic. Two elements are
indispensable to the perspective of externalism: semantic memory (a certain mastery over
the word meanings) and testimony (it is through the others’ words that we acquire mastery
over language and have access to information about the empirical and symbolic worlds).5
4 Epistemic Externalism and Reliabilism
According to externalism, rationality is not necessarily supported by what the agent can
cognitively access. The best and most reliable way of reaching truth does not need to be
discriminated and cognitively accessed by the agent itself (Vahid 2011). Reliabilism is the
strongest expression of externalism (Goldman 2012). This perspective—as all kinds of
externalism—is not centered upon the subject, since it conceives that beliefs are not
grounded on what is true to the agent at the moment of the belief state.
The externalism/internalism debate usually takes place in relation to criteria for justi-
fying beliefs (Kornblith 2001). Roughly speaking, internalists maintain that the justifica-
tion lies in the cognitive agent’s perspective on the world, even though they can
substantially diverge about what such perspective would be. Externalists, in turn, claim that
elements of justification can be external to the cognitive agent’s perspective (Vahid 2011).
Generally speaking, reliabilism claims that a belief is justified if and only if it is
produced or supported by a reliable process that tends to produce more true than false
beliefs. Provided that certain canceling conditions6 do not obtain, perception, memory, and
testimony are reliable. To bring the general reliabilist formulation closer to our current
theme, it is necessary to highlight that reliabilism seems to grant an important place to the
understanding of scientific theories and models in education, since these theories and
models result from procedures that typically generate more truths than falsities. In the face
of such a statement, it is important to keep in mind that Goldman and other reliabilist
5 Evidently, we can also acquire information about the empirical world through experience, but, yet, a great
deal of information we have about the latter comes from testimony.
6 A ‘‘cancelling condition’’ is any experienced situation that signals to the individual the imminent pos-
sibility of an error in the testimony, for example when he or she receives information that the individual who
is providing the testimony was found lying in similar situations.
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authors certainly support a fallibilist view about justification and human beliefs, which is
not committed to strong realism or any other perspective that avoids the plural and fallible
character of human beliefs (Goldman and Olsson 2009).
The point is not necessarily in establishing whether there is or there is no justification,
whether the subjects knows or does not know. It is also not the case of simply claiming that
cognitive processes are socially determined. What is at stake is that the very definitions of
knowledge and justification are entirely reformed, entailing that the distinction between
belief and knowledge does not refer to the fact that the subject can necessarily discriminate
between all the reasons that ground her belief:
(…) It is often assumed that whenever a person has a justified belief, he knows that it is justified and
knows what the justification is. It is further assumed that the person can state or explain what his
justification is. On this view, a justification is an argument, defense, or set of reasons that can be
given in support of a belief. Thus, one studies the nature of justified belief by considering what a
person might say if asked to defend, or justify, his belief. I make none of these sorts of assumptions
here. I leave it an open question whether, when a belief is justified, the believer knows it is justified. I
also leave it an open question whether, when a belief is justified, the believer can state or give a
justification for it. I do not even assume that when a belief is justified there is something ‘possessed’
by the believer which can be called a ‘justification’ (Goldman 1979/1992, p. 106).
What is assumed by Goldman is that a justified belief has this status due to some social
processes that make it justified. Nevertheless, these social processes are not necessarily
possessed by the subject, but by the social interactions that produce reliable processes.
Goldman (1979/1992) lists a set of requisites that might offer support to beliefs or,
alternatively, a set of counterexamples that might cancel those requisites. Among them, a
decisive factor is the causal component in the formation and maintenance of beliefs.
Granted that principles of justified belief must make reference to causes of belief, what kinds of
causes confer justifiedness? We can gain insight into this problem by reviewing some faulty pro-
cesses of belief formation, i.e., processes whose belief-outputs would be classed as unjustified. Here
are some examples: confused reasoning, wishful thinking, reliance on emotional attachment, mere
hunch or guesswork, and hasty generalization (Goldman 1979/1992, p. 113).
What is shared by those processes is their non-reliable character, which follows from the
fact that they typically produce mistakes, differently from other processes, such as standard
perceptual processes, remembering, good reasoning, and introspection, which are typically
reliable, generally producing truths. Thus, Goldman’s proposal is that the justifiedness of a
belief is a function of the reliability of the processes that cause the belief.
In this sense, the following is a general requisite for justification:
If S’s believing p at t results from a reliable cognitive belief-forming process (or set of processes),
then S’s belief in p at t is justified (Goldman 1979/1992, p. 116).
Another important question concerns the fact that an anti-reductionist perspective such
as Goldman’s does not claim that the subject is, at a given moment, necessarily ignorant of
the justification status of her beliefs, but only that she should not necessarily have
knowledge about this status. Just as one can know without knowing that one knows, one
can have justified beliefs without knowing that they are justified—or how they are justified
(Goldman 1999). The focus is on the subject, but the criterion for justification lies in the
fact that the belief is the result of a reliable belief-forming process. We can be mistaken in
our evaluation of what processes are reliable, but this does not affect the adequacy of the
explanation (Goldman 1979/1992).
Reliable processes involved in the justification of beliefs also involve webs of testi-
monies that are not, by their turn, necessarily justified by independent reasons. When an
academic credential, say, a doctoral title, is presented to the student, she will not typically
T. A. S. Ferreira et al.
123
Author's personal copy
do the ‘‘field work’’ of verifying if the teacher really did all the courses in her doctoral
studies, defended her thesis, and completed all the other steps needed to obtain the title.
And even if the student does so, she will have to trust, in the end, the testimony of people
who will attest (or not) those facts.
Returning to Siegel’s argument, he also claims that, if the initial argument in relation to
authority, academic credentials, and behavior of other teachers, parents, etc., is rejected,
there are still other alternatives to fight anti-reductionism:
Consider, as an example, the algebra (or history) student. Let us suppose that on the first day of class
the student has no independent reason to trust what her teacher tells her about the subject. But as the
class proceeds, every day the student sees the teacher introducing material about which the student is
ignorant, hears the teacher’s explanations, observes the teacher answer her (and other students’)
questions, sees the teacher speak extemporaneously on tangents that (it is often apparent) were not
part of the teacher’s lecture/lesson plan, etc. All this provides the student with testimony-independent
(defeasible) reasons for trusting the teacher’s claims with respect to that subject matter (Siegel 2005,
p. 362).
Using the reasons put forward by Siegel, we can acknowledge that the observation of a
science teacher’s behavior (as well as of the other students) can make the student accept or,
for that matter, at some point reject the teacher’s testimony. For instance, she can refuse to
accept the latter when she notices that the teacher does not present arguments for defending
her claims. Two considerations are relevant in this case:
1. To assume that the observations made by a student, or group of students, can lead to
the rejection of the teacher’s testimony does not invalidate the claim that, everything
else being equal, along the classroom life testimony is usually a reliable source of
knowledge. To put it differently, the falsity of a testimony or the addition of reasons
independent from the testimony for the credibility of what the teacher says in specific
moments can only take place against a broad background of initial reliance on the web
of testimonies that is generated by science and, in this particular case, by school
science. This web of testimonies is produced under the influence of what is said by
textbooks or by teachers and other actors participating in it.
2. When we claim that observations can lead to the rejection or acceptance of a
testimony, we should remember that, as argued by Coady (1973), testimony can also
lead to the rejection of observations. This claim is supported by experiments in social
psychology (Rodrigues 1998). If we claim that perception can lead us to reject
testimony, and, thus, perception would be the more basic source of belief, we will need
to consider that testimony can also lead us to reject perception and, thus, testimony can
also be taken as such a basic source.
The question at stake reaches beyond the classroom, even though in a manner that
directly influences it: Science is not able to advance if the reliance on the testimonies of
other scientists in the same community cannot be assured. After all, new knowledge is
generated without any scientist necessarily having to do all the basic experiments (and
others) in her field of research. One assumes that, say, the data obtained in a series of
studies are reliable based on the testimony of whole community (through peer review,
citations, etc.) and goes on with the process of scientific knowledge production. In the
scientific community too, a web of testimonies attests which methodologies are to be used
and what evidence resulting from the use of those methodologies is available, with no need
that scientists use all the methodologies described in the papers of a field (or, for that
matter, of other fields) and obtain the same evidence before continuing with the work
guided by knowledge acquired on the basis of testimonies.
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To deny that testimony participates as a primary source (just as deduction, induction,
perception) in scientific knowledge production is, in other terms, to deny the possibility of
a community producing that knowledge and advancing in understanding the investigated
phenomena based on the testimony of others about methods and data that are not neces-
sarily—and typically are not—reproduced by other scientists.
All that said, when we argue that Siegel’s criticism to Goldman’s argument is not
enough to reject anti-reductionism regarding testimony, we do not draw the conclusion that
critical thinking—or understanding—is not a goal of science teaching. That is, we can both
reject Siegel’s criticism of Goldman and agree with what he advocates regarding the goals
of science education. The question can be then modified as follows: Can anti-reductionism
with respect to testimony as a source of knowledge be compatible with the proposal that
critical thinking or understanding is a primary goal of science teaching, just as Goldman
states truth is?
It does not seem that there is an a priori incompatibility between anti-reductionism and
the proposal of critical thinking and understanding as primary goals of science teaching.
But to clarify this statement, we need to consider what Siegel (with Smith) calls under-
standing. The debate between El-Hani and Mortimer, on the one hand, and Hoffmann, on
the other, brings to the fore elements that can help making this notion clear.
5 Belief Change and the Primary Goals of Science Teaching
The discussion about the goals of science teaching involves a key conceptual aspect, which
entails the need of clear and precise definitions of the terms used, as well as an essentially
pragmatic aspect, marked by the analysis of the ethical and methodological consequences
of acknowledging and accepting diverse discourses. From an externalist epistemic per-
spective, grounded on a view of science that treats it in its connection with sociocultural,
political, and anthropological aspects, these two dimensions—conceptual and pragmatic—
cannot be conceived in isolation. Even when we are dealing with the conceptual aspect, we
cannot neglect its relationship with a social and political positioning that directly reflects in
classroom science teaching. It is in this sense that we will analyze the debate between El-
Hani and Mortimer (2007), and Hoffmann (2007).
Hoffmann’s criticism of El-Hani and Mortimer’s proposal of culturally sensitive science
education begins by establishing the conceptual parameters of the debate, but, along the
argument, makes clear an explicit political positioning concerning the teacher–student
relation in the science classroom. With the term ‘‘politics,’’ we mean here a reflection
about the procedures for reaching an ethical ideal (Dittrich 2004) and, in this sense, an
analysis of Hoffmann’s stance about the goals of science teaching cannot avoid reflections
indicating the ethical implications of that stance.
Traditionally, it is assumed that the goals of science teaching entail that the student
should acquire knowledge. But what does this mean? Is there in this goal the presuppo-
sition that the student should change her beliefs about the world? Or is there the possibility
of knowledge without belief change? Following Cobern (1996), El-Hani and Mortimer
(2007) argue that a person can understand ideas in which she does not believe, i.e., accept
as true or valid. She can thus acquire knowledge in the sense of understanding a given
claim or idea without changing her beliefs.
Using a practical example, El-Hani and Mortimer refer to a study (Dole et al. 1991,
cited by Sinatra et al. 2003) that found no relationship between students’ stated belief in
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creationism and their ability to understand texts about evolution. They interpret this study
as showing that it is possible for a student to understand evolutionary theory without
accepting its validity, just as it is possible that a student accept this theory, even though she
has limited understanding of it.
The concept of understanding is conceived by them along the lines proposed by Smith
and Siegel (2004), as including the following conditions:
1. Connectedness.
2. Sense-making.
3. Application.
4. Justification.
Thus, according to Smith and Siegel, the understanding of something is composed of a
coherent connection between ideas, which allows us to make sense of it, and, also, to apply
it in academic and non-academic situations. The justification condition, in turn, is deflated
in relation to more rationalist proposals, amounting to the subject’s capacity of appraising
at least some of the reasons that render something worthy of belief.
Taking this notion of understanding into account, El-Hani and Mortimer (2007)
maintain a differentiation between understanding and belief, and claim that the primary
goal of science teaching lies in reaching the former, not belief change, no matter if we are
talking about religious, philosophical, or commonsensical principles. It is precisely the
distinction between understanding and belief that is taken as a point of departure in
Hoffmann’s (2007) criticism. Hoffmann quotes a key passage in their paper:
A primary factor for achieving success in teaching science as traditionally defined and, yet, con-
tribute to empower students is, in fact, to avoid taking change of belief as a goal of science education.
We should focus, rather, on understanding of scientific ideas, which means that a student should
grasp the connections between scientific concepts and statements; be able to make sense of them; be
capable of applying them in the appropriate contexts, not only in academic settings; and properly
appreciate what counts as good reasons in the domain of science. It is particularly important that the
criterion of justification does not entail that students should believe in scientific ideas, but only that
they should appreciate the reasons that make those ideas worthy of belief (El-Hani and Mortimer
2007, p. 679).
Hoffmann begins his criticism by claiming that ‘‘without believing that something is the
case, there cannot be any knowledge that this is the case.’’ Then he goes on: ‘‘Based on
these considerations it does not make any sense to me to give up the goal of ‘belief change’
in education.’’ In other terms, he claims, ‘‘For El-Hani and Mortimer, (…) it is sufficient
that students can ‘handle’ scientific knowledge without knowing it in this cognitive sense’’
(Hoffmann 2007, p. 690).
Hoffmann’s argument seems to be logically structured as follows:
1. Belief is a condition for knowledge.
2. Knowledge acquisition is among the basic science teaching goals.
3. To acquire knowledge entails to acquire new beliefs, some of them contrary to
previous beliefs.
4. Belief change is a necessity if knowledge is among the basic science teaching goals.
5. Therefore, belief change is at least part of the goals of science teaching.
Even if we assume that Hoffmann’s criticism shows fragilities in how El-Hani and
Mortimer use the term ‘‘belief,’’ we can claim that his criticism fails mostly because there
is a categorical mistake involved in the debate between these authors. It would not be
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difficult to assume that El-Hani and Mortimer could state, in a tone of voice,7 that belief
change is a necessity for the understanding of science and, in another tone of voice, that
belief change is not a necessity for the understanding of science.
Our argument has to do with the difference between having beliefs about science and
having beliefs in science. The difference between ‘‘believe that’’ and ‘‘believe in’’ in
relation to science can be translated into the difference between believing that science
describes the world in a certain way (‘‘believe that’’) and believing that the scientific
description is true (‘‘believe in’’). To claim that Paul believes that the scientific claims state
X is different from claiming that Paul believes those claims to be true (in the latter case, we
would say that Paul believes in science).
Hoffmann is right when he says that ‘‘without believing that something is the case, there
cannot be any knowledge that this is the case,’’ but fails in that he does not acknowledge
that what one claims to be ‘‘the case’’ can be a series of statements about science, and not
the very statements of science itself.8 The question is: can I have knowledge about certain
propositions, even though I do not regard them as knowledge? The answer is clearly in the
affirmative. I can deeply know a novelist’s propositions about a given historical fact, and
because I deeply know those propositions and also know (through other sources) the
historical fact in itself, I can assure that the novelist’s claims are just elements of her
fiction, not to be regarded as knowledge of the historical fact.
In sum, the question comes down to whether the goal of science teaching is that students
learn what scientific theories or models claim about the world or that they learn about what
the world is in fact like, or both. Our position is that the proper goal is that students learn
what scientific theories or models claim about the world. Whether they also believe that the
world is like the scientific theories or models state (i.e., whether they believe in science) is
not something to be directly shaped by the teacher, but a position the students can adhere to
or not, depending on their own decisions.
It is evident, however, that Smith and Siegel’s proposal is not that the student might regard
science as a fiction. In relation to science teaching, their conception of understanding—particu-
larly in the condition ‘‘justification’’—demands that the student believes that, given the empirical
evidence, the scientific explanationprovidedby the teacher for a phenomenon is the best one.This
is clearly a stronger demand than we would ask someone to fulfill if we were to regard her as
someone who knows a fictional work. Nevertheless, it does not entail that the student, after
appreciating the reasons that justify a scientific interpretation, necessarily needs to believe in it,
even though such level of understanding typically leads to belief (everything else being equal).
El-Hani and Mortimer’s (2007) proposal is consistent with the claim that students’
understanding about science, which implies their knowledge about science, does not depend
on the students having their beliefs necessarily modified toward the content of scientific
propositions. Even though belief change usually follows from understanding, this should not
necessarily be the case for both teacher and students in order for them to be regarded as
successful in what is expected of them in the classroom. In this sense, the success in reaching
the goals of science teaching does not depend on changing students’ belief in science, but on
their knowledge/understanding about science. This is how we interpret Smith and Siegel’s
(2004, p. 553) statement that:
7 The expression ‘‘tone of voice’’ is used by us, following Gilbert Ryle (1949/1984), in order to indicate a
specific semantic context. It indicates that the same speaker can use the same word to refer to different
existence categories.
8 This is the same kind of problem found in the difference between the expressions ‘‘teaching science’’ and
‘‘teaching about science.’’
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where a student evidences a meaningful understanding but still disbelieves, […] the appropriate goal
is for students to believe that the theory in question affords the best current scientific account of the
relevant phenomena based on the available empirical evidence.
Hoffmann’s argument that El-Hani and Mortimer’s proposal leads to a kind of fake-
learning faces difficulties such as the following: If a student understands science only
through memorizing textbook information and comes to believe in science, we shall claim
that she has knowledge, while a student who understands science not only through
memorizing texts, but by analyzing its principles and by showing critical thinking, cannot
be regarded as having scientific knowledge unless she has also modified her beliefs toward
scientific ideas. Critical thinking would then come into tension with knowledge,
particularly if the student is in fact led to disbelieve in scientific statements by critically
thinking about them, and, say, realizing how the principles underlying them are at odds
with her own worldview. This suggests that we are taking the more coherent direction by
assuming student understanding and knowledge as the primary goals of science education,
to be shaped directly by the teachers in the classroom, instead of belief change.
But let us analyze, once again, Hoffmann’s statement that belief change is part of the
goals of science education. Expanding on his argument, Hoffmann writes: ‘‘As I argued
above, the essential idea of believing as well as of knowing is that a person is in a certain
cognitive state of accepting something as true’’ (Hoffmann 2007, p. 690). If we want to
examine this claim, the terms at stake should be clarified: What does it mean to accept a
scientific proposition as true? Does it mean to substitute scientific beliefs for beliefs at odds
with science?
A subject’s belief system can be much more complex than one can capture by the
simple division between believing in what science says and believing in what religion says
(as an example of another belief source). Consider the following example: a biology
student, who comes from a family that has a deep-rooted practice of praying to cure
diseases, spends 4 years studying scientifically corroborated mechanisms for disease eti-
ologies and treatments and, after that, claims that she believes in science and has modified
her prior beliefs, adopting a scientific perspective. And she indeed does more than just
saying, never been found again appealing to prayers when she, or close friends and rela-
tives, fall ill. Instead, she repeatedly uses and recommends scientifically validated prac-
tices. Suppose, however, that years later she eventually discovers that she is suffering from
a very severe and incurable disease. She then calls her parents, and soon the whole family,
including her, initiates a series of prayers for her cure. Suppose, also, that in this new stage
of her life, the student goes on with her religious practices, defending that they are
important means to treat diseases, while she also seriously pursues her engagement in
learning life sciences. What should we say then? That she knew and understood science
and now she doesn’t anymore? Or that she never truly knew and understood science? The
situation seems more complex: The previous beliefs were not simply replaced by scientific
beliefs, but after learning science, some contexts evoked scientific beliefs to her, while
some others evoked religious beliefs. To claim that belief change is a primary goal of
science teaching involves a subtle distinction between two possibilities: belief change
involves only acquiring new beliefs or also the replacement of previous beliefs? This is not
clear in Hoffmann’s arguments, and is important to the debate, since the first meaning of
belief change seems compatible with the claim that the primary goal of science teaching is
understanding and knowledge, whereas the second is not.
Hoffmann develops his arguments by considering the case of a student who does not
believe in science, but it can be fruitfully expanded to examine what are the putative
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implications when a science teacher does not believe in certain scientific theories. Lackey
(1999, p. 477) provides us with a useful description:
Suppose that a Catholic elementary school requires that all teachers include sections on evolutionary
theory in their science classes and that the teachers conceal their own personal beliefs regarding this
subject-matter. Mrs. Smith, a teacher at the school in question, goes to the library, researches this
literature from reliable sources, and on this basis develops a set of reliable lecture notes from which
she will teach the material to her students. Despite this, however, Mrs. Smith is herself a devout
creationist and hence does not believe that evolutionary theory is true, but she none the less follows
the requirement to teach the theory to her students.
Given reliable evidence on Mrs. Smith’s students successful learning, we can claim that
they can obtain knowledge through her testimony, despite the fact that she does not believe
in that scientific theory. The case in point is that even though Mrs. Smith does not believe
in that theory, she both understands and knows about it and is aware of what is expected of
her as a science teacher, a social role that she herself chose.9 Can a teacher who does not
believe in science be an epistemic causal factor in students’ acquisition of scientific
knowledge? It is possible to perceive that in this case, the argument of categorical mistake
does not apply: Even acknowledging that the teacher can have knowledge of that scientific
theory, despite the fact that she does not believe in it, the students may have acquired
beliefs in science from the teacher’s testimony. In conformity with an anti-reductionist
perspective in the epistemology of testimony, one can claim that the scope of justification
for those students’ knowledge (in both senses: a justified belief about science and in
science) does not concern the empirical verification of the scientific statements, but the
teacher’s testimony about (quite often) what textbooks authors testify about the world.
Even considering that the teacher understands science but does not believe in it, it seems
difficult to sustain that the students cannot have acquired scientific knowledge (in a sense
that would satisfy Hoffmann’s requirements) and, sometimes, that they have even changed
their beliefs due to their teacher’s testimony. It is unlikely that the primary goal of science
education could be conceived as belief change in this case, since the teacher herself does
not believe in the scientific theory she is teaching and would hardly assume that goal in her
classes. Surely, it might be the case that the students’ beliefs change toward a scientific
standpoint following the teacher’s testimony. However, our focus here does not lie on what
might or might not happen, but on the normative dimension of the goals of science
teaching.
This scenario can be interestingly extended to relations within science and philosophy:
I take it that similar considerations apply in cases where a Kantian teaches utilitarianism, a dualist
teaches physicalism, an atheist teaches Christianity, and so on. If the theory in question is true and a
hearer comes to believe it by means of the teacher’s testimony, then, I would say, the hearer can
acquire knowledge on this basis … (Lackey 1999, p. 477).
9 Certainly, a key problem with religious science teachers is that several of them refuse to teach a given
scientific theory, such as evolution, and often do not understand it or know a lot about it. To discuss this
issue, however, would lead us away from our main focus in the article. Our view about it, however, is quite
simple: to choose to be a science teacher is to choose a given social position, as part of a process of teaching
the scientific perspective of the world, and if a teacher does not lend herself to play this expected social role,
this will simply mean that she is inadequately placed in that role. Perhaps some people think this is
controversial, but we regard it as quite a plain point: to go to the science classroom and refuse to teach a
scientific theory (or, for that matter, to teach ideas at odds with scientific theories) is like going to the mass
or service of worship pretending to be a priest or pastor and, instead of doing what is expected of oneself,
teach a scientific theory such as evolution. Both situations are untenable for precisely the same reasons.
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Up to this point, we can say that the conceptual criticism of El-Hani and Mortimer’s
argument made by Hoffmann points to a gap in it, namely the lack of a clear definition of
the term ‘‘belief,’’ but at the same time generates more conceptual problems, related to the
definition of what would be a ‘‘belief change’’ as a goal of science teaching. We shall now
turn to the pragmatic implications of Hoffmann’s perspective to the science classroom.
Still considering the case of students who exhibit beliefs at odds with the scientific
perspective, Hoffmann establishes a demarcation between what is and what is not scientific
knowledge that we can put into suspicion:
… there is no question that the attempt to justify knowledge claims is what distinguishes scientific
knowledge from other forms of being sure about something (Hoffmann 2007, p. 692, emphasis in the
original).
He suggests, thus, that other knowledge systems (religion, art, philosophy, etc.) do not
attempt to justify their knowledge claims. But what is justification in this context? Is it
limited to the collection of empirical evidence? Or to some other specific practices? It does
not seem correct to restrict justification to the empirical backing of statements. In fact, to
claim that science attempts to justify its knowledge claims, while other forms of
knowledge do not, entails two flaws:
1. Justification is defined based on what science explicitly proposes and, therefore,
knowledge in general ends up being reduced to scientific knowledge.
2. It ignores that a great deal of scientific knowledge justification is grounded on the
same justification principles found in other forms of knowledge (testimony, memory,
etc.).
This way of demarcating between different forms of knowledge has relevant classroom
implications, since it legitimates specific teaching practices. Consider, for instance, the
following claim:
.. how can a teacher honor those [students’] beliefs more than by treating them as being worthwhile to
be criticized and to be improved—based on arguments, not on indoctrination (Hoffmann 2007,
p. 694).
At first, this seems to indicate some collaborative attitude between the teacher and the
students. However, it also neglects power relationships within the classroom. Subjects who
have undergone an educational process to become teachers and have dedicated themselves
to think about scientific issues potentially have much more argumentative skills than high
school students. Moreover, the very role of the teacher, who uses evaluation instruments
that exert a certain power over the students, does not allow the discussion between teachers
and students to take place in conditions that are equally favorable to both sides. For
instance, a limit for rational debate between teachers and students follows from the fact
that teachers will often be unwilling to give up their position (Kolsto and Ratcliffe 2008;
Zemple´n 2011). This makes the asymmetry between students and teachers in the didactic
situation quite clear. Certainly, this kind of asymmetry in the teacher–student relation is not
limited to argumentative situations. The teacher most likely exerts some kind of power in
the classroom, no matter if she is aware of it or not.
When a science teacher assumes the educational goal of directly shaping or changing
her students’ beliefs, it will follow that her practice and discourse will tend to show to
students that their beliefs are not in an appropriate direction and that science, in turn, offers
much better propositions. She will tend to criticize and try to improve students’ beliefs
based on arguments. There would be no problem with these attitudes and practices if the
relation between teacher and students in the classroom was free from power relations. But
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this is certainly not the case. In the end, the teacher who assumes the goal of belief change
will hardly be in a position of someone who honors her students’ beliefs. It will be almost
unavoidable that she will become an indoctrinator.
One might claim, then, that in El-Hani and Mortimer’s proposal, the situation would not
be that different. As understanding typically results in belief, as Smith and Siegel (2004)
argue, the teacher would still be guiding students’ knowledge in certain directions (par-
ticularly in the direction of science) when teaching for understanding. But the key point
here is that even though it is impossible that the teacher does not influence her students’
beliefs, she is not primarily and directly striving to do that. There is no problem in the fact
that teaching influences students’ beliefs. This cannot be the point, because if it has no
effect in students’ belief, teaching will not be teaching at all. The true problem emerges
when some practices that can easily turn into indoctrination are legitimated because the
primary goal of science education is taken to be students’ belief change. Science teaching
will not generate critical thinking, as a key dimension of understanding, if it degenerates
into mere indoctrination. The thesis that understanding is the primary goal of science
teaching still needs more systematic reflection, but when compared to the appeal to belief
change, it is, in our view, a more meaningful way of conceiving what science education
should be about.
6 In Conclusion: Epistemology of Testimony and Epistemic Agency
The reflection about the compatibility between (1) the proposition that the understanding of
scientific theories, models, and concepts is a primary goal of science teaching and (2) the
critique of reductionism in the epistemology of testimony is embedded into a larger issue in
the didactics of science and other knowledge fields: Is it possible to combine in a consistent
manner rationality and testimony-based knowledge?
A person is an epistemic agent if she not only believes, but she has reasons to believe
and has skills that allow her to think about those reasons. Generally speaking, epistemic
agency conditions are not satisfied by making reference to a subject’s dispositional
capacity to think and believe, or even by referring to the influence that those thoughts and
beliefs exert over the explanation of her actions. Besides those abilities, the epistemic agent
should also exhibit the capacity of reflection upon such thoughts and beliefs, creating
conditions for her actions to be guided by this self-reflective character.
Despite the fact that trust in testimonies has been almost indisputably presented as a
participating element in our beliefs, there are still few works that consider the possibility
that trust in testimonies could be a necessary condition to ascribe rationality to individuals.
Evidently, the claim that trust in testimonies could play a fundamental role in the relation
between a subject and her own mental states is even more counterintuitive than the claim
that it could be necessary to the elaboration of human understanding.
As Richard Fumerton (2006, p. 81) discusses, the traditional view about human
understanding does not attribute to testimony any role in the constitution of rationality:
So the most perspicuous characterization of the traditional internalist’s approach to understanding the
role of testimony in acquiring justified belief is probably that strictly speaking there is no testimonial
inference at all. When we make explicit critical unstated premises, we find that the reasoning that
takes account of testimony is just some other familiar sort of deductive or non-deductive reasoning
that employs at least one premise describing what other people say.
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Admitting that Fumerton is correct in his characterization, the traditional definition of the
role of testimony in understanding reduces it to more basic elements, such as induction and
deduction. From this perspective, testimony would not have any fundamental role in
understanding and rationality, since it would be nothing but a reference to inductive or
deductive processes. This traditional formulation is expressed by Fumerton as follows
(2006, p. 80):
‘‘1) Jones said that P in conditions C (where C includes a description of Jones, his qualifications as an
authority, and the circumstances under which he made the assertion).
2) People who make assertions like P in conditions C are usually saying something true. Therefore,
3) P’’
This traditional view is, thus, an example of a reductionist argument, since it states that
testimony is reducible to more basic constitutive units of understanding, such as deduction
and induction (e.g., Lackey 2006). A reductionist position assures that any reference to
testimony as being constitutive of understanding is just a manner of referring to inductive
and deductive processes. For the reductionist, therefore, it is necessary to strive for
pointing to reasons for the student to trust their teachers who are independent from
testimony.
Apparently, both the criteria to understanding put forward by Smith and Siegel (2004)
and the broader criteria to ascribe rationality to individuals are intuitively distant from a
testimony basis. The latter criteria, for instance, usually refer to the subject’s capacity to
know what she thinks and the possibility that this same subject accepts the responsibility
for the actions guided by those thoughts. Some arguments, however, escape from this
apparently intuitive conclusion. Consider the following case:
Suppose that […] I find my department chief and the graduate studies program chair discussing
alternatives to deliver an exemplar of a thesis […] to a certain Pedro. As I do not have more classes to
give or any other commitment before the evening, I have a car available, and I am inclined to
collaborate to the extent that I can, I ask: ‘Where does Pedro live?’ If in that situation somebody
asked me ‘Who is Pedro?’, I would hardly have any better answer to offer than saying something like
‘Pedro is the one they are talking about’ (Faria 2006, p. 105).10
If we assume externalism (in its reliabilist version, e.g., Goldman’s) as a legitimate
position, in this case the subject apparently has no capacity to discriminate between the
content of his thought and other possible alternatives (Sosa 1991/2000). Considering the
information given, a skeptical thinker might claim that the subject cannot have in hands all
the relevant information to know what he is thinking, since he cannot establish a
conceptual distinction between her cognitive states in relation to relevant situations. In this
case, relying on the testimony of others entails that the subject’s capacity to have cognitive
access to her reasons to believe is so precarious that he is not capable of knowing who is
Pedro, but just that he is the one other people are talking about.
Nevertheless, from a reliabilist externalist perspective, it will be correct to claim that the
acquaintance needed to use a proper name may be mediate instead of immediate. If we take
mediation into account, the situation in which the subject in the example above is found
does not seem as precarious as it seemed at first. The direct implication of the claim that a
speaker could have no authority to speak about her own thoughts would be that we could
not use in an appropriate manner many of the terms that we use in our everyday utterances.
This would be the case because a great deal of the meaning ascriptions to specific terms
10 The original text is in Portuguese, and the passage has been freely translated into English by the authors
of the article. Although Faria is dealing with the epistemic problem of memory in his article, the same
example can be used in relation to both memory and testimony.
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takes place because of a historical chain of uses of the term, not due to any direct reference.
For instance, we can legitimately use the name ‘‘Socrates’’ as we do today because Plato
knew Socrates, Aristotle knew Plato, Theophrastus knew Aristotle, in a succession that
reaches our times (Geach 1980). The reference to ‘‘Pedro’’ in the example mentioned
above can be made, just as in the case of ‘‘Socrates,’’ due to the existence of a web of
testimonies that are true, from an anti-reductionist perspective. This does not deny, evi-
dently, the possibility of error, but makes less intuitive to assume that we need extra
guarantees for the trust in testimonies to be legitimate or for the testimony to be true unless
relevant alternatives appear.
By ‘‘relevant alternatives,’’ we mean any lived situation that signals to the individual the
imminent possibility of error in the testimony, for instance, when she receives information
that the person who is offering the testimony has been found lying in similar situations. In
the absence of relevant alternatives, the web of testimonies of which we are part needs to
be assumed as reliable if intersubjective communication is possible. Moreover, without the
possibility of such communication, the problem of rationality would not even appear.
If these arguments are valid, the capacity of individuating contents of our own thoughts
is also derived from reliance upon the testimonies of others, not from a direct reference to
the object of the proposition. Trust in testimonies would be, thus, part of what composes
the legitimacy of ascribing to a subject the capacity of being rational or, more specifically,
an epistemic agency.
The deflation of the notion of rationality resulting from the insertion of arguments
related to memory and testimony brings philosophical reflections about rationality closer to
other organized systems of knowledge, such as history and psychology. Moreover, this
deflation can be extended to the notions of critical thinking and understanding, and given
this deflation, it is possible that critical thinking is not only instrumental (as proposed by
Goldman). Understanding and, consequently, critical thinking can be a primary goal of
science teaching provided we can ascribe rationality and criticality to a subject who does
not necessarily need to present reasons independent from the testimony for her thinking.
The four conditions for understanding put forward by Smith and Siegel can be reached
provided that reliance on testimony composes the broad background for the development
of the abilities involved in them. In this case, Goldman’s argument of infinite regression
does not apply: The student’s capacity of critical thinking does not entail an infinite
regression because it can be anchored in statements that are ‘‘merely’’ supported by a web
of testimonies. To show the capacity of critical thinking—at least in the deflated sense
presented here—does not entail saying that all elements in the student’s thinking need to be
justified by reasons that are independent of the others’ testimony. To use the example
above, to ascribe to the student the capacity of critical thinking about the Socratic argu-
ments does not presuppose that the very individuation of the term ‘‘Socrates’’ cannot be
justified by a web of testimony. For this reason, the thesis advocated here is not limited to a
‘‘compatibility’’ between anti-reductionism and understanding as a major goal of science
teaching. Anti-reductionism concerning the role of testimony is taken as a basis for
avoiding Goldman’s criticism when entertaining the four conditions for understanding
proposed by Smith and Siegel (2004). Against the broad background of reliance on tes-
timony, the infinite regression criticism cannot be even formulated.
It is true that the science teacher does not need to provide reasons for all elements in her
statements. In fact, she does not even need to know all the reasons that support those
statements, beyond the testimony of the scientific community. However, this does not
prevent her from evaluating at least some of these reasons, while several other reasons are
justified only by the web of scientific testimonies. In this deflated sense, to consider critical
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thinking as a major goal of science teaching does not entail an infinite regression, or a
reductionist perspective about the epistemic role of testimony.
Trust in testimonies can be said to be not only compatible with understanding and
critical thinking, but also necessary for the development of these attributes of epistemic
agency rationality by science students or any other participant of the social/communicative
game.
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